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Abstract
Senegal is the only African country where sex work is legal and regulated by
a health policy. Senegalese female sex workers (FSWs) are required to regis-
ter with a health facility and to attend monthly routine health checks aimed at
testing and treating sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Compliance to those
routine visits is recorded on a registration card that must be carried by FSWs
in order to avoid sanctions in case of police arrests. Although this policy was
first introduced in 1969 to limit the spread of STIs, there is no evidence so far
of its impact on FSWs' health and well-being. The paper aims to fill this gap
by exploiting a unique data set of registered and unregistered Senegalese FSWs.
Using propensity score matching, we find that registration has a positive effect
on FSWs' health. However, we find that registration reduces FSWs' subjective
well-being. This finding is explained by the fact that registered FSWs are found
to engage in more sex acts, in riskier sex acts, have less social support from their
peers, and aremore likely to experience violence from clients and police officers.
We prove that those results are robust to the violation of the conditional inde-
pendence assumption, to misspecification of the propensity score model, and
that covariate balance is achieved. The results suggest that more efforts should
be deployed to reduce the stigma associated with registration and to address the
poor well-being of FSWs, which is counterproductive to HIV prevention efforts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The legal status of sex work varies widely across countries worldwide, but sex work is illegal in most countries and where
legal, soliciting, pimping, or running brothels often remain illegal. The reason for prohibiting sex work lies in moral
concerns and on the idea that legalization could increase the spread of HIV and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) by
increasing the number of commercial sex acts. However, because criminalization is associated with greater isolation and
stigma toward female sex workers (FSWs) and clients (Weitzer, 2005), some studies highlighted that criminalizing sex
work translates into more risk-taking and leads to greater STI transmission (Cameron, Muz, & Shah, 2016; Cunningham
& Shah, 2014; Gertler & Shah, 2011).
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Although most countries have acknowledged sex work as a public health concern, only a few have used registration
and monitoring of STIs in FSWs as a policy to control the spread of HIV/AIDS in the general population, and Senegal is
currently the only African country where sex work is regulated by a public health policy. Indeed, given that STIs increase
both the risk of new infections amongHIV-negative people and the risk of transmission fromHIV-positive people (Galvin
& Cohen, 2004), STI treatment is a highly cost-effective HIV prevention strategy (Gilson et al., 1997), particularly among
FSWs (Steen & Dallabetta, 2003). Since 1969, Senegalese FSWs aged more than 21 years old have been compelled to
register with a health center and to attend routine health visits in order to be tested and treated for STIs and to receive
free condoms (Chersich et al., 2013). An official registration card is issued (called “carnet sanitaire”) to keep a record of
the visits made to the appointed health center. If FSWs are tested positive for any STI, with the exception of HIV, the
card is kept at the health center during the whole course of treatment. Screened HIV-positive FSWs will be linked into
care, and adherence to antiretroviral treatment will be monitored during routine visits, hence limiting the spread of the
disease. FSWs who fail to present an up-to-date registration card (either because they are not registered, do not comply
with routine visits, or are currently being treated for STI) may incur a prison sentence of between 2 and 6 months (cf.
Code pénal articles 319/ 325). The registration policy was inherited from the French colonial rule and find its root in the
medical and sanitary policies that were elaborated at the federal level until independence in 1960 (Becker & Collignon,
1999). Since its introduction, no significant changes in this policy were implemented, except for minor adjustments in
the appearance of the carnet sanitaire.
Despite its legal status, sex work is morally condemned by society members in Senegal, and keeping sex work secret is a
central preoccupation of Senegalese FSWs. Becoming a registered FSW increases the probability that the sex work activity
will be discovered because first, FSWs need to carry and hide their concealed registration card while at home; second,
registered FSWswill meet clients in public places ; third, compulsory visits for FSWs are held on a specific day (Thursday);
and finally, personal information of registered FSWs will remain in police records even if they leave sex work. The fear of
becoming a social outcast acts as a main barrier to registration and explains that 80% of FSWs in Senegal (Foley & Nguer,
2010) and 57% in the capital city, Dakar, are not registered (APAPS & IRESSEF, 2015). This justifies that FSWs are still a
main contributor to the HIV epidemic: with a prevalence of 6.6%, they are up to 9 times more likely to be infected with
HIV than the general population (APAPS & IRESSEF, 2015).
Although many studies investigate market-level effects of legalizing sex work, a few studies provide causal evidence.
Among these, only two studies consider a context where sex work is legal and regulated by a public health intervention.
The seminal work by Gertler and Shah (2011) consider the changes in police raid probabilities under an existing registra-
tion policy in Ecuador. Using survey data of FSWs containing biological markers, they show two conflicting impacts on
STI incidence: an increase in the brothel sector and a decrease in the street sector. Quast and Gonzalez (2017) consider a
registration policy implemented in Tijuana, Mexico, that closely resembles the Senegalese setting that we consider in this
paper. The policy was introduced in 2005 and is shown to have led to a decrease in the incidence rate of trichomoniasis in
the general population by 37% between 2005 and 2012. Although this latter paper finds an overall beneficial effect of this
public health policy on STI prevalence at the population level, it does not uncover possible complex behavioral responses.
In order to fill this gap in knowledge, this paper aims to evaluate the impact of becoming a registered FSW in Senegal
on both health and subjective well-being of sex workers and to identify pathways of impacts. To do so, we first develop a
theoretical framework that models the main effects of registration on health and well-being and points out the different
channels at play. Based on the theoretical model, we show that the effect of registration on health is both positive and
negative: registration leads to a greater number of sex acts, which translates to a higher incidence rate of STIs but, at the
same time, is associated with greater investment in health capital through the prevention and early treatment of STIs. We
also show that registration deteriorates well-being through increased stigma, which could partially offset the beneficial
health effect of registration, assuming that low well-being leads to increased risk-taking (Yuen et al., 2016).
We then test the model's predictions empirically by using a unique data set collected from a sample of 630 FSWs in
Dakar, stratified by the registration status. Given the voluntary nature of registration, we use propensity score match-
ing in order to construct a balanced sample of registered and non-registered FSWs. Our empirical results show that the
net effect of registration on STI reduction is positive. Empirical analysis also sheds light on several unintended conse-
quences of the policy on well-being that may attenuate its positive impact on STIs reduction: registered FSWs engage
in more and riskier sex acts, are more likely to experience physical violence, and have less social support from their
coworkers. We investigate the effect of the violation of the conditional independence assumption (CIA) by simulat-
ing the effect of relevant unobserved confounders affecting both the treatment and the outcomes of interest. We show
that the existence of such confounders is unlikely to affect the results. Finally, our empirical results are robust to two
additional methods to improve the performance of the propensity score matching: namely, the use of a super learner
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to improve the specification of the propensity score and the use of entropy balancing in order to achieve covariates
balance.
To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature on the regulation of sex work, but, unlike previous studies, it
adopts a unique angle by investigating the consequences of registration on FSWs themselves in order to provide a full
picture of their behavioral response. The paper also contributes to the literature on social stigma by highlighting the
negative unintended effects of a public health policy targeting high-risk groups to limit the spread of STIs and HIV/AIDS.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, wemodel the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents
the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the method to overcome the selection bias associated with the deci-
sion to register along with the sensitivity analysis undertaken to test the violation of the CIA. Results and a series of
robustness checks are presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Setup
Let us consider a country where prostitution is regulated. Sex workers can, in such context, choose between two types of
prostitution: either they choose to solicit clients in public places or they choose to remain discreet. If they choose to solicit
clients in public places, they will access a larger pool of clients, but to do so, they need to register with authorities to avoid
penal sanctions. Therefore, a sex worker chooses both the number of sex acts a and her registration status R = {0, 1} in
order to maximize her utility.
The utility of a FSW under registration status R depends on her consumption cR, expected external stigma 𝛿s, inter-
nal stigma 𝜏, and expected legal penalty (1 − R)rm. We assume consumption and various utility costs to be additively
separable.
U = u(cR) − 𝛿R(aR)s(A) − 𝜏(aR) − (1 − R)r(aR)m. (1)
Despite the legalization of prostitution by a government, prostitution is often morally condemned by the society. We
consider two kinds ofmoral costs: external stigma s, when identified as a sex worker by her relatives, friends, or neighbors;
and internal stigma 𝜏, a FSW suffers from damages of her self-image and self-esteem when engaging in commercial sex
acts. The chance 𝛿 of being identified as a sex worker is no smaller under registration, 𝛿1 ⩾ 𝛿0 for a given a. This is a direct
consequence of multiple elements related to registration that are implemented in Senegal, such as holding a registration
card issued only to FSWs, working in public places, and being registered in police files.1,2 We assume that 𝛿R increases
with aR, 𝛿′(aR) ⩾ 0,∀aR ∈ R+.
We assume that external stigma increases with the level of wealth of the family, s(A) > 0, s′(A) > 0,∀A ∈ R+, as it may
damage a family reputation and awealthier familymay feelmore strongly against prostitution. Internal stigma is assumed
to be nondecreasing in the number of sex acts, 𝜏′(a) ⩾ 0 for all a. A legal penaltym only applies to non-registered FSWs.
Its sanction probability r(a0) is assumed to be nondecreasing in a0, r′(a0) ⩾ 0,∀a0 ∈ R+. We assume that u is increasing
and concave in c (u′(c) > 0,u′′(c) ⩽ 0,∀c ∈ R++).3
Given that the non-registered FSWs cannot work in all venues and are limited to a subset of the market,4 we conjecture
that the market size is bigger for the registered FSWs. So the (inverse) demand is larger for registered FSWs, that is,
w0(a) ⩽ w1(a).5 In addition, we assume that such a difference in market size is bounded from below in terms of a density
ratio 𝛿
1′
𝛿0′
. We combine these two market size related assumptions as Assumption 2.1.
Assumption 2.1. For all a ∈ R+:
w1′ (a)a + w1(a)
w0′ (a)a + w0(a)
⩾ 𝛿
1′ (a)
𝛿0′ (a)
.
1This assumption of differential probability may seem to be conjectural rather than factual. However, based on anecdotes from focus groups discussions
in which they stressed a worry of the registration card to be found by relatives, we believe that this assumption is realistic in the Senegalese context.
Our data also show that the main reason for not registering is the preference for discreetness, which hints that FSWs believe 𝛿1 ⩾ 𝛿0.
2We also note that predictions of the model are sharper if we do not impose it and use 𝛿0 = 𝛿1 or 𝛿0 > 𝛿1 instead, yet we can still derive the results
with 𝛿1 ⩾ 𝛿0.
3For completeness, we note that we assume s(0) > 0, that is, that even the poorest FSW feels external stigma if being identified as a sex worker. We
further assume that 𝛿 and r follow symmetric, bell-shaped density functions, which implies that the density is increasing for values below mean and
decreasing for values above mean 𝜇a, or 𝛿R
′′ (a) ⩾ 0 for a ⩽ 𝜇a, 𝛿R
′′ (a) < 0 for otherwise, and r′′(a) ⩾ 0 for a ⩽ 𝜇a, r′′(a) < 0 otherwise.
4This is confirmed in our database, in which a larger share of non-registered FSWs operates at home.
5In Section 3, we found that price distributions for registered and non-registered FSWs overlap and theirmeans are not statistically significantly different
fromeach other. At the same time, the number of acts is larger for the registeredFSWs, and theirmeandifference is statistically significant. The registered
FSWs derive larger incomes from sex acts than the non-registered FSWs. The strict inequality holds when a bigger registered market has clients who
have higher willingness to pay for all sex act levels a.
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Intuitively, the inequality in Assumption 2.1 states that the marginal gain in income is greater than the marginal loss
in terms of chances of being identified as a sex worker, as one switches from unregisterd to registered. This assumption
always holds for a bell-shaped density with equal dispersions at a ⩽ 𝜇a1 . Note also that it is independent of A, so any FSW
will choose to supply more sex acts had they registered. This, of course, does not mean that all FSWs will be better off by
registering and by supplying a larger number of sex acts.
2.2 The FSW's problem
A FSW under registration status R solves the following maximization program:
max
{aR}
u(cR) − 𝛿R(aR)s(A) − 𝜏(aR) − (1 − R)r(aR)m
s.t. wR(aR)aR + A = cR.
(p1)
The first order condition (FOC) is
F ≡ u′ · (wR′aR + wR) − 𝛿R′ (aR)s(A) − 𝜏′(aR) − (1 − R)r′(aR)m = 0. (2)
As the marginal income is larger for the registered w1′ (a)a + w1(a) ⩾ w0′ (a)a + w0(a), for a given A, Equation 2
immediately gives that a1 ⩾ a0.
In Figure 1, the optimal aR is given by the intersection eR of u′ and 𝛿
R′ s+𝜏′+(1−R)r′m
wR′aR+wR .
To make sure that the solution is a maximizer, we assume the following (for more details on the concavity of the
maximization problem, see Appendix A.1.4):
Assumption 2.2. Internal stigma 𝜏 is an increasing, convex function of a, such that it dominates the decrease in
density 𝛿′′ and r′(a) for any level of A andm for a large a:
𝛿R
′′ (a)s(A) + 𝜏′′(a) + (1 − R)r′′(a)m ⩾ 0.
For a small a under bell-shaped density for 𝛿′′ and r′, this is always satisfied.
FIGURE 1 A large A case (left) and a small A case (right) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 2 Registration decision over A. FSWs: female sex workers [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
A FSW will register if the value function under registration V1 is larger than the one under illegality V0. Because the
FOC depends on A through marginal utility and marginal expected external stigma, the decision to register also depends
on A. A FSW decides to register if
V0(A) = u
{
w
(
a0
)
a0 + A
}
− 𝛿0
(
a0
)
s(A) − 𝜏
(
a0
)
− r
(
a0
)
m
< u
{
w1
(
a1
)
a1 + A
}
− 𝛿1
(
a1
)
s(A) − 𝜏
(
a1
)
= V1(A).
(3)
By using the envelope theorem, one can show that VR is increasing in A and the slope is greater for V0 than V1. So the
inequality (3) is likely to hold for a small A, which we summarize as Assumption 2.3.
Assumption 2.3. Equation 3 holds for a small enough A.
Given that external stigmadepends positively onhouseholdwealth, one can show that the decision to registerR switches
from 0 to 1 as A becomes smaller. That is, there exists A such that V1(A) > V0(A) for A ≤ A as shown in Figure 2. We
note that a FSW with a smaller A provides more sex acts hence finds more benefits in registration:
daR
dA = −
FA
Fa
= −u
′′ · (wR′aR + wR) − 𝛿R′ (aR)s′(A)
SOC .
The denominator is the SOC= u′′ · (wR′aR + wR)2 + u′ · (2wR′ +wR′′aR) − {𝛿R′′s+ 𝜏′′(a) + (1−R)r′′(a)m} that holds strictly
under the assumptions we have made (SOC = Fa < 0 ). This is depicted as negatively sloped value functions in Figure 2.
A penalty m increases the marginal cost of supplying a, so it decreases the number of sex acts a0 by the non-registered
FSWs. In Figure 2, it shifts down the value function of non-registration, changing the intersection to bm and thus the
associated threshold asset to a larger level denoted as A(m) with A′(m) > 0, A(m) > A(0) form ∈ R++. A larger penalty
induces FSWs with a larger A to register.
2.3 Results
All the results obtained are summarized in the following propositions and corollaries.
Proposition 2.1. There exists A such that V1(A) ⩾ V0(A) for A ≤ A: For a small enough level of wealth, a FSW decides
to register.
Proposition 2.2. a1 ⩾ a0: For a given level of asset A, a registered FSWperformsmore sex acts than anunregistered FSW.
Proposition 2.3. aR decreases with the level of asset A.
Proposition 2.4. A < A(m): A legal penalty of nonregistration induces FSWs with a larger A to register.
Corollary 2.1. w1(a1)a1 ≥ w0(a0)a0: A registered FSW earns more.
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Corollary 2.2. 𝛿1(a1)s(A) ≥ 𝛿0(a0)s(A) and 𝜏(a1) ≥ 𝜏(a0): A registered FSW suffers from greater external and internal
stigma.
In Appendix A.1.3, we introduce health risks under an assumption that registration reduces the expected health costs
through consultation and treatment. We show that all the propositions continue to hold along with additional results on
health:
Proposition 2.5. The greater the probability 𝛽R of being cured, the greater the sex act supply aR. The access to quality
health services increases the number of sex acts.
Proposition 2.6. The greater the damage I, the smaller the sex act supply aR. The severity of a disease reduces the number
of sex acts.
We remark the following:
Remark 2.1. If the relative risk of being infected for registered FSWs compared with non-registered FSWs is lower
(greater) than the relative probability of being treated, that is, 𝜋(a
1)
𝜋(a0) < (>)
(1−𝛽0)
(1−𝛽1) , registration ensures a lower (greater)
expected physical health damage.
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Data were collected from 320 registered and 310 unregistered FSWs over 21 years of age and living in Dakar suburbs
in June and July 2015, which represents 15% of the estimated total FSWs in the region of Dakar (APAPS, 2011–2012).
Registered FSWs were recruited by the midwife in charge of their medical follow-up. All active registered FSWs from four
(Pikine, Rufisque, Mbao, and Sebikotane) out of the five STI health centers located in Dakar were contacted to participate
in our study. Unregistered FSWs were recruited by FSWs' group leaders. FSWs were asked to come to the health center
and were interviewed at the health facility in private dedicated rooms. Survey participants receive a CFAF 3,000 show up
fee that aimed to cover transport cost and the time spent at the health facility.
Wemeasure physical health by the probability of being sick over the last 4weeks and by the presence of lower abdominal
pain in the last month because lower abdominal pain, unlike vaginal discharge (Desai et al., 2003), has been shown to be
strongly correlated with pelvic inflammatory disease (Bentsi et al., 1985). In the sample, 42% had an illness episode over
the last 4 weeks, and 12% suffered from lower abdominal pain. Subjective well-being is measured by happiness level, life
satisfaction in general, and self-esteem. Data highlight very low level of well-being in our sample: 30% of FSWs declare
that they are not happy, 25% that they are not at all satisfied with their lives, and 15% strongly disagree with the statement
“Overall, I am satisfied with myself.”
Furthermore, information on their use of prevention services, their sex work environment, and their social networks
was also collected. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of registered and unregistered FSWs. On average, sampled
FSWs are 36 years old and have low level of education. Most FSWs are divorced, and among these, only 7% receive any
spousal maintenance from their ex-partner, which is consistent with the fact that 92% of FSWs report to have entered the
sex work market because of financial reasons. Regarding household composition, they live in households of six persons
on average: 34% live with their parents, 62% with their children, and 48% with their brother, and they have two children.
Regarding sex work activities, on average, FSWs have been in the sex work business for 8 years. FSWs report a monthly
earning of USD 229 (CFAF 133,492), havemonthly household expenditure of USD 607 (CFAF 353,881), and havemonthly
per capita expenditure of USD 165 (CFAF 96,520), which is 2.2 times higher than the level of per capita expenditure
in Dakar reported in the national statistics (CFAF 43,260; ANSD, 2013). In the sample, the demand for HIV and STI
prevention is high given that 74% of FSWs are affiliated to a STI center and 57% have visited the STI center less than a
month ago. Self-reported condomuse is also high, as 98% report to have used a condomwith the last client, however when
elicited indirectly via a list experiment, condom use rate dropped to 78% (Treibich & Lépine, 2016). In general, FSWs tend
to self-report taking low risks in sexual behaviors: Only 2% report to have engaged in anal sex, and 6% report to have had
sex with more than one client at a time.
4 METHOD
4.1 Propensity score matching
In order to evaluate the impact of the registration policy, one would ideally need to compare the outcome Y1 for a regis-
tered FSW (R = 1) with the outcome Y0 that we would observe if this FSW was not registered (R = 0). Unfortunately,
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TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
All FSWs Unregistered FSWs Registered FSWs
Variables N Mean N Mean N Mean p value
Sociodemographic characteristics
Age (in years) 630 36.42 310 36.01 320 36.81 0.257
Divorced (%) 630 0.708 310 0.668 320 0.747 0.029
No education (%) 629 0.278 310 0.226 319 0.329 0.004
Has at least one child (%) 630 0.888 310 0.897 320 0.881 0.536
Father or mother lives in Dakar (%) 630 0.548 310 0.626 320 0.472 0.000
Preference towards the future (%) 630 0.210 310 0.181 320 0.238 0.080
Altruism (USD) 630 0.47 310 0.37 320 0.58 0.000
Risk aversion (CRRA based on Gneezy and Potters game) 630 0.754 310 0.759 320 0.749 0.859
Beauty (score out of 10) 630 5.78 310 5.85 320 5.71 0.308
Entered the sex business alone (%) 630 0.532 310 0.577 320 0.488 0.024
Fatality (%)a 628 0.635 309 0.702 319 0.571 0.001
Own house (%) 630 0.200 310 0.268 320 0.134 0.000
Final outcomes
Physical health
Has been sick or injured in the past 4 weeks 630 0.419 310 0.461 320 0.378 0.035
Had lower abdominal pain in the past month 629 0.116 310 0.145 319 0.088 0.025
Well-being
Is not happy 630 0.303 310 0.258 320 0.347 0.015
Is not at all satisfied with her life in general 629 0.245 310 0.210 319 0.279 0.043
Strongly disagree with
“Overall I am satisfied with myself” 629 0.146 310 0.106 319 0.185 0.005
Intermediate outcomes
Prevention
Received free condoms 621 0.680 303 0.472 318 0.877 0.000
Is affiliated to an STI center 627 0.740 308 0.542 319 0.931 0.000
Went to an STI center in the last month 630 0.567 310 0.274 320 0.850 0.000
Had an HIV screening in the past year 630 0.810 310 0.674 320 0.941 0.000
Sought care for last STI 267 0.775 112 0.768 155 0.781 0.806
Sought care for last illness 630 0.721 310 0.710 320 0.731 0.547
Unhealthy behaviors
Cigarette expenses in the last 7 days 627 1,152 310 895 317 1,403 0.096
Alcohol expenses in the last 7 days 627 984 309 347 318 1,602 0.003
Sex work environment
Number of clients per week 627 6.514 310 5.145 317 7.852 0.000
Usually attracts clients in bars or nightclubs 630 0.421 310 0.245 320 0.591 0.000
Last client was an occasional client 624 0.442 307 0.358 317 0.524 0.000
Had alcohol before last sex act 619 0.076 305 0.039 314 0.111 0.001
Last client consumed alcohol 617 0.152 306 0.085 311 0.219 0.000
Last sex was with more than one client 583 0.062 297 0.037 286 0.087 0.012
Used a condom during last sex act 562 0.977 296 0.973 266 0.985 0.327
Anal intercourse during last sex act 624 0.022 307 0.013 317 0.032 0.119
Fellatio during last sex act 624 0.064 307 0.059 317 0.069 0.584
Is not satisfied at all with sex work 627 0.418 310 0.342 317 0.492 0.000
In the past year:
Suffered from violence by an occasional clientb 364 0.291 177 0.243 187 0.337 0.049
Suffered from police violenceb 553 0.061 310 0.039 243 0.091 0.012
Fear of police
In the past year:
Reported violence incident to the policeb 74 0.257 32 0.188 42 0.310 0.240
Earnings and savings
Monthly earnings from sex work (FCFA) 628 133,492 310 100,461 318 165,692 0.000
Savings in the past month (FCFA) 624 15,964 308 3,482 316 28,131 0.000
Leaving sex work
Is sure that she will no longer
be a FSW in 3 yearsc 563 0.355 278 0.371 285 0.340 0.456
Social network
Continued
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TABLE 1 Continued
All FSWs Unregistered FSWs Registered FSWs
Variables N Mean N Mean N Mean p value
Rivalryd 630 139 310 87 320 188 0.000
Altruism towards other FSWs 630 137 310 125 320 148 0.174
Satisfaction in friendship domaine 612 2.466 304 2.559 308 2.373 0.011
Has at least one FSW to go for reassurance 603 0.474 306 0.533 297 0.414 0.004
Has at least one FSW to borrow money from 603 0.393 306 0.438 297 0.347 0.022
Stigma
Family knows about her sex work activity 620 0.281 306 0.235 314 0.325 0.013
Life satisfaction with familye 629 2.571 309 2.654 320 2.491 0.024
Note. N stands for the number of observations. FSWs: female sex workers; STI: sexually transmitted infection. Fatality = 0 if strongly disagree with “if someone
is meant to have a disease he will get it.” FSWs who registered less than a year before the interview were excluded. FSWs who did not understand the proposed
scale were excluded. Rivalry is measured as the difference in the amount given to an NGO that takes care of street children and the amount given to another
FSW in two dictator games. Life satisfaction is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, with a higher number denoting higher life satisfaction.
because FSWs are either registered or unregistered, these two sets of outcomes are never observed for a same FSW. If the
registration status was randomly assigned, a simple difference in outcome means between legal and illegal FSWs would
provide accurate estimates of the impact of the policy. However, given that FSWs register to the policy on a voluntary basis,
registered FSWsmay not closely resemble unregistered ones as shown in Table 1. In order to control for the selection bias
due to observables, we use propensity score matching.
Following the notation of Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), wewant to estimate the effect of being a registered FSW given
by
𝛼 = E(Y1 − Y0|X ,R = 1). (4)
This is the expected difference in the outcomes between the treated and the control after accounting for the observable
characteristics (X).
The aim ofmatching is to pair every registered FSWwith similar FSWs from the control group based on their observable
characteristics (X). Our analysis relies on the CIA that the outcomes of the non-treated FSWs (Y0) and treated FSWs (Y1)
are independent of the registration status R once one controls for (X).
(Y0,Y1) ⟂ R|X . (5)
Given the high dimension of X, a more feasible option is to match on a function of X. It has been shown that the
probability to register P(X), or the propensity score, can serve as such a function under the overlap assumption, which
states that FSWs who are similar along the selected set of observable characteristics (X) must have a strictly positive
probability to be either treated or untreated:
0 < Pr(R = 1|X) < 1. (6)
Hence, wematched on the propensity score to create a balanced sample. CIA and the overlap assumption are combined
as the strong ignorability assumption (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983):
(Y0,Y1) ⟂ R|P(X). (7)
Once the closest matches among the controls have been found, we use the Gaussian Kernel matching estimator that
matches all treated unitswith aweighted average of all controlswithweights that are inversely proportional to the distance
between the propensity scores of treated and controls. Valid standard errors were obtained by bootstrapping.
𝛼t =
1
NT
∑
i∈T
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
YTi −
∑
𝑗∈CYC𝑗 G
( p𝑗−pi
hn
)
∑
k∈CG
(
pk−pi
hn
)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
, (8)
where NT is the number of units in the treated group i and NC in the control group j, p is the propensity score, G(.) is a
kernel function, and hn is a bandwidth parameter.
Let S⋆ be the space of X that is simultaneously observed among registered and non-registered FSWs (common support
of X). The expected average effect of the registration policy among treated participants (ATT) for whom we can find a
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comparable non-treated match is given by
∫S⋆E(Y1 − Y0|P(X),R = 1)dF(P(X)|R = 1)
∫S⋆dF(P(X)|R = 1) . (9)
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Our main analysis is based on the CIA, which assumes that there is no unobservable characteristic that explains both the
decision to register and the outcomes of interest. Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicinni (2008) propose a simulated sensitivity
analysis to test whether the results obtained with the propensity score matching are robust to specific failures of the
CIA. The idea is to assume that the selection on observables assumption is not satisfied given the observables considered
(Equation 10) but could be if one could observe an additional binary variable U (Equation 11).
(Y0,Y1) ⟂∕ R|X . (10)
(Y0,Y1) ⟂ R|X ,U. (11)
We assume that the unobserved variable may impact both the treatment and the outcome. To describe the distribution
of the hypothetical confounding variable U completely, we can define four probabilities pij where the treatment status R
and the outcome Y are observed in the data:
pi𝑗 = Pr(U = 1|R = i,Y = 𝑗). (12)
Ichino et al. (2008) define the selection effect Λ as the effect of U on the relative probability to be assigned to the
treatment and the outcome effect Γ as the effect ofU on the relative probability to have a positive outcome in the absence
of treatment.
Λ =
P(R = 1|U = 1,X)
P(R = 0|U = 1,X)
P(R = 1|U = 0,X)
P(R = 0|U = 0,X)
. (13)
Γ =
P(Y = 1|R = 0,U = 1,X)
P(Y = 0|R = 0,U = 1,X)
P(Y = 1|R = 0,U = 0,X)
P(Y = 0|R = 0,U = 0,X)
. (14)
Put differently, an outcome effect of Γ> 1(< 1) means that the unobservedU positively (negatively) affects the outcome
variable. Similarly, a selection effect of Λ > 1(< 1) means that the unobserved U increases (decreases) the probability to
register.
In order to study the robustness of the results obtained with propensity score matching to the violation of the CIA,
Ichino et al. (2008) propose two alternatives. A first approach relies on the assumption that the unobserved variable U
should have a similar selection and outcome effects than the ones of covariates. To implement this test, we fix pij = P(U =
1|R = i,Y = j) according to their values for the set of covariates used in the propensity score model. A second approach
is to search for the existence of parameters pij such that if U were observed, the estimated ATT would be driven to zero.
To do so, we simulate all possible distributions of U6 and test the plausibility of the configurations of parameters killing
the ATT. If the distribution of U killing the ATT is considered unlikely, this exercise would support the robustness of the
estimates derived under CIA.
5 RESULTS
In this section, we first model the decision to register with authorities and estimate the propensity score. In the second
step, we present the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) using Kernel matching. We then implement the sen-
sitivity analysis to study the consequences of the violation of the CIA on the main findings. Finally, we investigate the
6We fixed p11 = p10 and then varied the values of p11, p01, p00 from 0.1 to 0.9 (Ichino et al., 2008).
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TABLE 2 Determinants of registration
Variables Coefficient Robust SE
Age 0.000 0.002
Divorced 0.076∗ 0.044
No education 0.059 0.043
Has at least one child −0.085 0.062
Father or mother live in Dakar −0.118∗∗∗ 0.041
Preference towards the future 0.071 0.047
Altruism 0.209∗∗∗ 0.042
Risk aversion 0.010 0.027
Beauty −0.049 0.048
Enters the sex business alone −0.085∗∗ 0.038
Fatality −0.096∗∗ 0.041
Own house −0.161∗∗∗ 0.049
Observations 627
R2 0.119
VIF (max)/(mean) 1.28/1.09
Note. VIF stands for variance inflation factors and is used to test multicollinearity of
independent variables. Binary variable which equals 1 if the women gave more than 40% of
the money received in a dictator game to a street children association.
∗p< 0.1. ∗∗p< 0.05. ∗∗∗p< 0.01.
robustness of the results by usingmultivariate reweightingmethod to produce balanced samples and by further improving
the specification of the propensity score by using machine learning.
5.1 Determinants of registration
5.1.1 Determinants of registration
Table 2 presents the determinants of registration and includes observable characteristics that may affect the decision to
register with authorities but that we consider to be exogenous to outcomes. To choose the most relevant set of covariates,
we use predetermined variables and elicited preferences that we assume to influence the decision to register.
Among the non-registered FSWs, the main reason against registration was the willingness to remain discreet (44%);
followed by the fact that their sex work activity was occasional (18%), the poor knowledge of the legal system (10%), or
procrastination (4%). Hence, a key determinant of registration is associated with the fear of being a social outcast. To
account for this, we include whether the FSW's parents live in Dakar as this would increase the risk of being discovered
by relatives. In addition, we include whether the FSW was introduced to sex work by another FSW assuming that those
FSWswould bemore likely to be aware of the registration policy than thosewho entered sexwork alone. It is assumed that
FSWs who have other opportunities outside sex work may decide to do this activity only occasionally. We thus control for
a set of variables that may be correlated with the FSW's opportunity cost such as educational level to account for outside
work opportunities, but also age and beauty to account for the fact that younger or more attractive FSWs will be more
willing to meet clients in bars and nightclubs and hence will have greater benefits in becoming registered FSWs. We also
control for whether FSWs are divorced and whether they have children as this may be correlated with their economic
vulnerability.
Among registered FSWs, health concerns (62%) and police threats (36%) were the main reasons for registering. In order
to account for these factors, we control for the following intrinsic attributes: risk aversion in the financial domain (elicited
via the Gneezy and Potters game with real payments),7 self-reported preference for the present, altruism (elicited via a
dictator game with real payment where the recipient was a street child), and self-reported fatalism. Moreover, we control
for whether the FSW's household owns the house she lives in. Contrary to the observed assets, which are a mix between
the FSW wealth prior to her entry in the sex industry and the earnings she has accumulated, we assume that house
ownership was more likely to have occured before entering sex work.
The selected set of covariates appears to significantly explain the registration status. Table 2 shows that 12% of the
variance in registration status is explained by the model. In particular, and as expected from the theoretical predictions,
FSWs who face more economic and social vulnerability are more likely to register.
7Although risk aversion in money may not directly be correlated with risk aversion in health, we expect that it will predict the decision of register
through financial losses resulting from the fine.
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FIGURE 3 Balance of covariates [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 4 Common support. FSW: female sex worker [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 3 Registration policy impacts—Final outcomes
Mean of
Number of Number of matched
Outcomes treated controls ATT SE Sign. controls
Physical health
Has been sick or injured in the past 4 weeks 318 308 −0.109 0.043 ∗∗ 0.483
Had lower abdominal pain in the past month 317 308 −0.055 0.031 ∗ 0.143
Well-being
Is not happy 318 308 0.077 0.041 ∗ 0.266
Is not satisfied at all in general 317 308 0.074 0.037 ∗∗ 0.207
Strongly disagree with
“Overall I am satisfied with myself” 318 308 0.090 0.028 ∗∗∗ 0.095
Note. ATT stands for average treatment effect on the treated. Results of the Gaussian Kernel matching on the common support with replacement
and 1,000 replications are presented here.
∗p< 0.1. ∗∗p< 0.05. ∗∗∗p< 0.01.
In order to test if the matching procedure is able to reduce the mean differences in observed characteristics between
registered and non-registered FSWs, we present the standardized percentage differences in covariates before and after
matching. As shown in Figure 3, those differences are considerably reduced, going from up to 43% before matching to
less than 10% for all covariates.
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5.1.2 Overlap
Figure 4 brings evidence that the overlap condition is fulfilled by representing the densities of the distribution of the
estimated propensity score for registered and non-registered FSWs. In fact, less than 1% of observations in our sample are
off support.
5.2 Effects of the policy
Tables 3 and 4 report the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
TABLE 4 Registration policy impacts—Intermediate outcomes
Mean of
Number of Number of matched
Outcomes treated controls ATT SE Sign. controls
Prevention
Received free condoms 316 301 0.369 0.039 ∗∗∗ 0.508
Is affiliated to an STD center 317 306 0.364 0.039 ∗∗∗ 0.566
Went to a health center in the last month 318 308 0.560 0.036 ∗∗∗ 0.289
Had an HIV screening in the past year 318 308 0.237 0.033 ∗∗∗ 0.707
Sought care last STI 154 110 0.025 0.075 NS 0.760
Sought care last illness 301 305 0.055 0.041 NS 0.716
Unhealthy behaviors
Cigarette expenses in the last 7 days 315 308 560 325 ∗ 850
Alcohol expenses in the last 7 days 316 307 1300 413 ∗∗∗ 289
Sex work environment
Number of clients per week 315 308 2.665 0.517 ∗∗∗ 5.215
Attracts usually clients in bars or nightclubs 318 308 0.338 0.040 ∗∗∗ 0.254
Last client was an occasional client 315 305 0.153 0.043 ∗∗∗ 0.368
Had alcohol before last sex act 312 303 0.062 0.024 ∗∗ 0.047
Last client consumed alcohol 310 304 0.125 0.033 ∗∗∗ 0.091
Multiple clients relationship during last sex act 285 295 0.051 0.022 ∗∗ 0.036
Used a condom during last sex act 265 294 0.016 0.016 NS 0.968
Anal intercourse during last sex act 315 305 0.019 0.013 NS 0.013
Fellatio during last sex act 315 305 0.015 0.021 NS 0.054
Is not satisfied at all with sex work 315 308 0.102 0.044 ∗∗ 0.393
In the past year:
Suffered from violence of an occasional client 186 168 0.101 0.052 ∗ 0.238
Suffered from police violence 242 308 0.047 0.024 ∗ 0.044
Fear police
In the past year:
If suffered from client violence
went to report it to the police 42 26 0.192 0.094 ∗∗ 0.117
Earnings and savings
Monthly earnings from sex work (FCFA) 316 308 62,793 114,77 ∗∗∗ 103,552
Savings in the past month (FCFA) 319 320 24,332 5,923 ∗∗∗ 3,534
Leaving sex work
Is sure that she will no longer
be a FSW in 3 years 283 276 −0.066 0.044 NS 0.405
Social network
Rivalry 318 308 54 24 ∗∗ 132
Altruism towards other sex worker 323 320 2 19 NS 147
Life satisfaction with friends 306 302 −0.255 0.080 ∗∗∗ 2.624
Has at least one FSW to go to be reassured 296 304 −0.146 0.047 ∗∗∗ 0.558
Has at least one FSW to borrow money to 296 304 −0.122 0.046 ∗∗∗ 0.467
Stigma
Family knows about her sex work activity 312 304 0.080 0.041 ∗∗ 0.244
Life satisfaction with family 318 307 −0.219 0.075 ∗∗∗ 2.710
Note. NS stands for “not significant.” ATT stands for average treatment effect on the treated. Results of the Gaussian Kernel matching on the common support
with replacement and 1,000 replications are presented here. FSW: female sex worker; STI: sexually transmitted infection.
∗p< 0.1. ∗∗p< 0.05. ∗∗∗p< 0.01.
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5.2.1 Effect on self-reported health
Overall, the net effect of registration on health is positive.We find that registered FSWs are 11 percentage points (23%) less
likely to have been sick or injured in the past 4 weeks. They also are 6 percentage points (38%) less likely to have suffered
from lower abdominal pain in the past 30 days.
5.2.2 Effect on well-being
Overall, the net effect of registration on well-being is negative. Registered FSWs are 8 and 7 percentage points (29% and
36%)more likely to declare that they are unhappy and unsatisfiedwith their life in general, respectively. Finally, registered
FSWs appear to have a lower self-esteem because they are 9 percentage points (95%) more likely to strongly disagree with
the statement “Overall I am satisfiedwithmyself.” Despite assuming that registration has a deterring effect on self-esteem,
we do not find that registration leads to a greater expectation of being in sex work in 3 years of time.
5.2.3 Effects on earning
Registration leads to a change in the place of sex work. Registered FSWs are 34 percentage points (133%) more likely to
work in bars or nightclubs, and this translates into a greater activity: Registered FSWs have on average 2.7 (51%) more
clients a week and greater earnings. We find that registered FSWs earn CFAF 62,793 (USD 107) or 61% more than unreg-
istered FSWs. This difference in earnings is only explained by a greater intensity of their sex work activity rather than by
a higher price charged per sex act. Indeed, there is no difference in the price charged by registered and non-registered
FSWs during the last sex act with both regular clients and occasional ones. In addition, the increase in earnings allows to
increase savings level, we find that registered FSWs save 24,332 (USD 41) more than unregistered FSWs.
5.2.4 Unintended effects
Change in risk taking
Based on information collected on the circumstances of the last paid sexual intercourse, it appears that the differences
in sex work environment also translate into riskier sexual behaviors. More precisely, legal FSWs are 15 percentage points
(42%) more likely to have had an occasional client as the last client, 6 percentage points (132%) more likely to have con-
sumed alcohol prior the sex act, and 13 percentage points (137%) more likely to have had sex with an intoxicated client,
which may explain that registration leads to a higher likelihood of experiencing violence from a client by 10 points (42%).
No difference in condom use or anal sex is detected between registered FSWs and unregistered FSWs, perhaps because
of the little variability in those variables (98% of FSWs declare having used a condom and not having performed anal sex
during the last sex act). However, registered FSWs were 5 percentage points (141%) more likely to have had a sex act with
multiple clients during last sex act. The results also show that because of the accrued contact with the police, registered
FSWs are also more likely to have experienced violence from a police officer in the past 12 months by 5 points (125%).
However, they are also more likely to report clients' violence to the police.
Social support
Greater competition among registered FSWs translates into lower psychological support from peers. We find that regis-
tered FSWs are 15 and 12 percentage points (26% in both cases) less likely to report to know a FSW who will reassure
her when she needs it and from whom she can borrow money, respectively. This rivalry between FSWs is also detected
when comparing the difference in the amount that registered FSWs agree to give to street children and to a peer FSW in
dictator games: Registered FSWs give 54 FCFA more (41%) to street children than to a peer in a dictator game than the
difference given by unregistered FSWs. This unintended effect may provide another explanation for the negative effect of
registration on well-being.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
In order to further investigate the extent of biases due to confounding factors, we conduct the sensitivity analysis suggested
by Ichino et al. (2008) to test whether the results obtained with the propensity score matching are robust to the violation
of the CIA.
More precisely, we implement the sensitivity exercise for different outcomes of interest, namely, STI symptoms and low
self-esteem. One may think of several unobserved variables that are likely to simultaneously influence their decision to
participate in the program and their physical health or well-being. In particular, one may argue that intra-family sexual
abuse during childhood may, on the one hand, explain the family breakdown and therefore can be positively correlated
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TABLE 5 Sensitivity analysis
Outcome Selection
effect effect
Γ Λ ATT SE
Outcome: Had lower abdominal pain in the past month
PSM result — — −0.055 0.031
Confounder-like
Divorced 0.922 1.653 −0.054 0.005
Preference towards the future 0.700 1.488 −0.054 0.004
Has at least one child 1.609 0.908 −0.055 0.002
Entered the business alone 1.196 0.695 −0.055 0.005
Own house 1.020 0.428 −0.056 0.007
Killer confounder
U= preference for health 0.432 4.790 −0.024 0.015
U 1.126 0.045 −0.050 0.031
Outcome: Strongly disagree with “Overall I am satisfied with myself”
PSM result — — 0.090 0.028
Confounder-like
No education 1.417 1.736 0.088 0.005
Father or mother live in Dakar 0.762 0.531 0.088 0.005
Fatality 0.247 0.565 0.075 0.008
Own house 0.915 0.427 0.089 0.006
Killer confounder
U = sexual abuse 4.323 8.846 0.034 0.022
U 0.023 0.371 0.027 0.017
Note. All covariates are binary variables. Five hundred replications have been performed for the
sensitivity analysis. ATT: average treatment effect on the treated; PSM: propensity score matching.
with the decision to register (selection effect, Λ > 1). On the other hand, it may also explain the difficulties of socializing
with peers and lower self-esteem (outcome effect, Γ > 1). Hence, the omission of this variable would mean that the esti-
mated effect of registration on well-being is overestimated. When turning to physical health outcomes, the individual's
preference for health is one of the main potential confounders because this characteristic is likely to be positively corre-
lated with registration (Λ > 1) and negatively correlated with the likelihood of experiencing an illness the last 4 weeks
(Γ < 1), leading to an overestimation of the effect of registration on physical health.
Twodifferent exercises are implemented in this sensitivity analysis. In the first step,we simulate anunobserved variable,
which would have similar selection and outcome effects than the one of covariates. Covariates with the greatest selection
and outcome effects are reported in Table 5. We find that any unobserved variable with similar treatment and selection
effects as the covariates already introduced in the propensity score matching will not confound our results. In the second
step, we measure the size of the outcome and selection effect the unobserved variable should have in order to kill our
results. To do so, we simulate all possible distributions of U (Figure A1 presented in Appendix A.2). Table 5 displays
some examples of outcome and selection effects for which our main results would disappear. Lastly, Figure 5 presents the
results of the sensitivity analysis. We show that in order to find a statistically insignificant effect of registration on health,
the potential confounder should have an outcome effect and a selection effect that is 2 and 3 times greater respectively
than what we observe in the covariates distribution. As for killing our results on well-being, the outcome and selection
effects should be almost 3 and 5 times bigger, respectively. The robustness of the results obtained in the main analysis are
confirmed graphically in Figure 5 where we can note that the ATT and significance levels shrink only for high levels of
selection and outcome effects.
5.4 Robustness checks
Propensity score matching is widely used in the literature to assess the causal effect of a program on a set of outcomes
of interest, controlling for the biases induced by self-selection into the program. Yet, besides CIA, consistency of the
propensity score estimator relies also on correct specification and balancing property.We conduct two alternativemethods
to preprocess data to avoid these caveats: namely, entropy balancing to achieve balance in covariates beyond the mean
(Appendix A.3) and a super learner to improve specification of the estimation of propensity scores (Appendix A.4). We
show that the use of these additional methods that increase the validity of the propensity score estimator do lead to
similar results. Finally, given the number of outcomes considered, we account for a false-discovery rate to control for the
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(a)
(b)
FIGURE 5 Killer confounders simulations. ATT: average treatment effect on the treated [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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proportion of type 1 error, that is, false rejection of the null hypothesis by performing the Benjamini–Hochberg (1995)
correction and similar significance levels were found after correction.8
6 DISCUSSION
Weanalyzed the effects of the registration policy for FSWs in Senegal. Our results show that this policy is effective in induc-
ing high-risk populations into using services to prevent and treat STIs. However, the results also confirm that becoming
a registered FSWs deteriorates well-being.
Our results point out the need of psychological services to FSWs part of the registration policy. In addition, it shows
that stigma attached to the current policy is counterproductive to HIV prevention efforts and prevents universal coverage.
Because 56% of FSWs declare that the card is the main reason for not registering, it is important to explore ways to reduce
the risks associated with the possession of the card. Over the last few years, the Ministry of Health have focused its efforts
on changing the appearance of the registration card in order to make it more discreet and less stigmatizing, but this did
not help increase registration, which points towards the need to remove the card. Although Senegal does not currently
have the infrastructure to dematerialize the proof of registration through the use of an online database, e-health and
m-health technologies could provide an effective low-cost solution. For instance, health visits could be tracked on amobile
application or a quick response code valid for 1 month could be issued at each medical visit. Less radical interventions
such as ones that would enable peers or bar/brothel owners to store the card could also be effective. In addition, FSWs'
routine visits must be better integrated to maternal healthcare services. Compulsory monthly visits held on a specific day
limits privacy and increases the risk of stigma. As a result, FSWs often decide to register in a health facility far from their
home, increasing high direct and indirect costs, which acts as a barrier to registration.
Our study assumed that FSWs select themselves into either registration or illegality. Our main assumption is that the
choice of status is determined by exogenous characteristics affecting the costs and the benefits of registration and as a
result we assume that it is unlikely that FSWs switch status over time. We test this assumption by inviting participants to
another survey that took place in August 2017, that is, 2 years after the survey that is used in this study. Among the 377
FSWs who could be contacted and who were still sex workers, only 26 (out of 208) became registered sex workers within
this 2-year time frame. Conversely, only three (out of 169) became unregistered in the same time frame. In addition,
we conducted a willingness to accept exercise with unregistered FSWs, and 56% of participants refused the maximum
hypothetical amount offered to register (CFAF 60,000), reflecting the difficulty to leverage registration over time due to
the high stigma attached to this policy.
The conclusions of this study are based on data collected from registered and unregistered FSWs in Dakar. Despite
providing the first evidence of the effect of compulsory registration for FSWs in Senegal, our study has some shortcomings.
First, although the sample of registered FSWs is likely to be representative of this population, unregistered FSWs were
recruited using snowball sampling, and this sample is likely to overrepresent unregistered FSWs who are connected to
FSWs groups and nongovernmental organizations. In addition, we were not able to include under-18 FSWs for ethical
reasons. One may want to argue however that although not generalizable to the whole population of FSWs, our results
still have good external validity. Indeed, because interventions to encourage registration will not reach the most isolated
unregistered FSWs, the effects of the registration policy presented in this study are likely to be closer to the ones we would
observe if an intervention to leverage registration was implemented in Senegal.
The main limitation of the paper is that it assumes that the registration policy only affects the intensive margins: Our
paper investigates the effect of registration on the behaviors of the current pool of FSWs but falls short in investigating
the effects at the market level. In fact, the effects of registration on market size and on the type of FSWs entering the sex
work market are unknown. If registration attracts riskier FSWs, the policy could have detrimental effect on population
health, even if the spread of STIs and HIV/AIDS is contained within the existing pool of FSWs. The effect of registration
hence depends on context (e.g., quality of care, STI/HIV prevalence, and extent of an appeal of services to unregistered
FSWs) and on the behavioral response of FSWs and clients.
Future research building on the results presented in this paper will consist in using mathematical and economic mod-
eling to estimate the cost-effectiveness of the registration policy in comparison with other HIV prevention policies (e.g.,
antiretroviral based prevention strategies) among FSWs in Senegal.
8Results are available upon request from authors.
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7 CONCLUSION
Few countries worldwide have opted for the regulation of sex work andmandatory medical screening of FSWs in order to
control the spread of STIs andHIV. In Senegal since 1969, FSWs have to carry a registration card that contains information
on the compliance to monthly health checks. Using primary data from registered and non-registered FSWs, we investi-
gate the effect of becoming a registered FSWs on physical health and well-being. We show that in Senegal, becoming a
registered FSW leads to a greater use of HIV/STI prevention services and reduced STI prevalence. However, because of the
stigma attached to registration, we also show that this policy has a detrimental effect on emotional and social well-being
of registered FSWs. This later element suggests that changes in the registration policy are required in order to eliminate
barriers to registration and their negative consequences on FSWs' well-being.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Model appendices
A.1.1 Full description of the setup
Let us consider a country where prostitution is regulated. Sex workers can, in such context, choose between two types of
prostitution: either they choose to solicit clients in public places or they choose to remain discreet. If they choose to solicit
clients in public places, they will access a larger pool of clients, but to do so, they need to register with authorities to avoid
penal sanctions. Therefore, a sex worker chooses both the number of sex acts a and her registration status R = {0, 1} in
order to maximize her utility. Let us denote a0 and a1 the number of sex acts performed by an unregistered female sex
worker (FSW) and a registered FSW, respectively.
Despite the legalization of prostitution by a government, prostitution is often morally condemned by the society. We
assume that if identified by her relatives, friends, or neighbors, a sex worker suffers from external stigma s. We assume
that external stigma depends on the level of wealth of the family, s(A) > 0,∀A ∈ R+, as it may damage a family reputation.
More precisely, awealthier familymay feelmore strongly than lesswealthy families that their reputation is tarnished if one
of their members is known to be working as a sex worker. Furthermore, poorer families may be less contemptuous when
discovering the source of the revenues the sex worker brings to the household if they are strongly financially constrained.
As a result, FSWs frompoorer families are less likely to be excluded from the household although theymay still experience
some external stigma within the household. We thus assume s′(A) > 0 for all A. In addition, a FSWmay also suffer from
damages of her self-image and self-esteem when engaging in commercial sex acts. We call this negative utility internal
stigma, 𝜏. We assume that internal stigma is nondecreasing in the number of sex acts, 𝜏′(a) ⩾ 0 for all a.
Registration is widely believed to increase the probability 𝛿 of being identified as a sex worker by friends, neighbors, or
relatives. This is a direct consequence ofmultiple elements related to registration that are implemented in Senegal, such as
holding a registration card issued only to FSWs, working in public places, and being registered in police files. Accordingly,
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we assume that, for a given a, the probability of being identified as a sex worker by others is larger for registered FSWs
than for unregistered FSWs, 𝛿1 ⩾ 𝛿0.9,10
Although the costs of registration are not clear cut, its benefits are unambiguous. If FSWs do not registerwith authorities
and solicit clients in public places, they risk a prison sentence and/or a fine, which we denote collectively as a penalty
m > 0. This penalty only applies to non-registered FSWs. The penalty sanction is likely to be stochastic in nature, and
its chance r(a) is nondecreasing in a, r′(a) ⩾ 0 for all a. Another benefit of registration is that registered FSWs receive
a medical follow-up that aims to prevent (through condom use distribution) and treat sexually transmitted infections
(STIs), which is expected to have a positive effect on FSWs' health.Wewill introduce the health benefits of the registration
program in a second step.
The utility of a FSW under registration status R depends on her consumption cR, expected external stigma, internal
stigma, and expected legal penalty. We assume consumption and various utility costs to be additively separable.
U = u(cR) − 𝛿R(aR)s(A) − 𝜏(aR) − (1 − R)r(aR)m. (A1)
We assume u is increasing and concave in c (u′(c) > 0,u′′(c) ⩽ 0,∀c ∈ R++), the chances of being known and being
arrested are both nondecreasing in a (𝛿′′(a) ⩾ 0, r′(a) ⩾ 0), internal stigma is nondecreasing in a (𝜏′(a) ⩾ 0), and external
stigma is increasing in A (s′(A) > 0).11
Next, we consider themarket conditions. Given that the non-registered FSWs cannot work in all venues and are limited
to a subset of the market,12 we conjecture that the market size is bigger for the registered FSWs. So the (inverse) demand
for registered and non-registered FSWs differ, and the former is larger, that is, w0(a) ⩽ w1(a).13 This implies that, for a
given a, a marginal income of sex work is no smaller for the registered:
w1′ (a)a + w1(a) ⩾ w0′ (a)a + w0(a) ∀a ∈ R+.
In addition, we assume that such a difference in market size is bounded from below. More precisely, we form a ratio of
marginal incomes and assume that it is bounded from below at 𝛿
1′
𝛿0′
: It is large enough that accessing a bigger market is
beneficial even if it implies a greater chance of being identified as a sex worker, which is satisfied for a ⩽ 𝜇a1 , where 𝜇a is
mean of a under a symmetric, bell-shaped density.
Assumption 2.1′. For all a ∈ R+:
w1′ (a)a + w1(a)
w0′ (a)a + w0(a)
⩾ 𝛿
1′ (a)
𝛿0′ (a)
.
The inequality in Assumption 2.1′ assumes that the ratio of marginal incomes is larger than the ratio of marginal
probabilities. Intuitively, it states that, under registration, the marginal gain in income is greater than the marginal loss
in terms of chances of being identified as a sex worker. When registration increases the probability of being known, or
𝛿1(a) ⩾ 𝛿0(a) for all a, 𝛿1′ (a) > 𝛿0′ (a) under Assumption 2.1′ is consistent with bell-shaped density functions (under
parallel displacement due to location parameter changes) for all a ⩽ 𝜇a1 . Note also that it is independent ofA, so any FSW
will choose to supply more sex acts had they registered. This, of course, does not mean that all FSWs will be better off by
registering and by supplying a larger number of sex acts.
A.1.2 The FSW's problem
A FSW's income is made of her sex work earning and other earnings such as assets, other occupation revenues, and
transfers. We consider earnings outside sex work as exogenously given and summarize them as an asset A. A FSW under
9This assumption of differential probability may seem to be conjectural rather than factual. However, based on anecdotes from focus groups discussions
in which they stressed a worry of the registration card to be found by relatives, we believe this assumption is realistic in the Senegalese context. Our
data also show that the main reason for not registering is the preference for discreetness, which hints that FSWs believe 𝛿1 ⩾ 𝛿0.
10We also note that predictions of the model are sharper if we do not impose it and use 𝛿0 = 𝛿1 or 𝛿0 > 𝛿1 instead, yet we can still derive the results
with 𝛿1 ⩾ 𝛿0.
11For completeness, we note that we assume s(0) > 0, that is, that even the poorest FSW feels external stigma if being identified as a sex worker. We
further assume that 𝛿 and r follow symmetric, bell-shaped density functions, which implies that the density is increasing for values below mean and
decreasing for values above mean 𝜇a, or 𝛿R
′′ (a) ⩾ 0 for a ⩽ 𝜇a, 𝛿R
′′ (a) < 0 for otherwise, and r′′(a) ⩾ 0 for a ⩽ 𝜇a, r′′(a) < 0 otherwise.
12This is confirmed in our database, in which a larger share of non-registered FSWs operates at home.
13In Section 3, we found that price distributions for registered and non-registered FSWs overlap and their means are not statistically significantly
different from each other. At the same time, the number of acts is larger for the registered FSWs, and their mean difference is statistically significant.
The registered FSWs derive larger incomes from sex acts than the non-registered FSWs. The strict inequality holds when a bigger registered market has
clients who have higher willingness to pay for all sex act levels a.
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registration status R solves the following maximization program:
max
{aR}
u(cR) − 𝛿R(aR)s(A) − 𝜏(aR) − (1 − R)r(aR)m
s.t. wR(aR)aR + A = cR.
(A2)
The first order condition (FOC) is
F ≡ u′ · (wR′aR + wR) − 𝛿′′(aR)s(A) − 𝜏′(aR) − (1 − R)r′(aR)m = 0. (A3)
A FSW chooses aR to equate the marginal consumptive utility with all marginal costs, expected external stigma, internal
stigma, and an expected legal punishment if not registered (R = 0). As the marginal income is larger for the registered
w1′ (a)a + w1(a) ⩾ w0′ (a)a + w0(a), for a given A, Equation A3 immediately gives that a1 ⩾ a0.
In Figure 1, the optimal aR is given by the intersection eR of u′ and 𝛿
R′ s+𝜏′+(1−R)r′m
wR′aR+wR .
To make sure that the solution is a maximizer, we assume the following (for more details on the concavity of the
maximization problem, see Appendix A.1.4):
Assumption 2.2′. Internal stigma 𝜏 is an increasing, convex function of a, such that it dominates the decrease in
density 𝛿′′ and r′(a) for any level of A andm for a large a:
𝛿R
′′ (a)s(A) + 𝜏′′(a) + (1 − R)r′′(a)m ⩾ 0.
For a small a under bell-shaped density for 𝛿′′ and r′, this is always satisfied.
A FSW will register if the value function under registration V1 is larger than the one under illegality V0. Because the
FOC depends on A through marginal utility and marginal expected external stigma, the decision to register also depends
on A. A FSW decides to register if
V0(A) = u
{
w
(
a0
)
a0 + A
}
− 𝛿0
(
a0
)
s(A) − 𝜏
(
a0
)
− r
(
a0
)
m
< u
{
w1
(
a1
)
a1 + A
}
− 𝛿1
(
a1
)
s(A) − 𝜏
(
a1
)
= V1(A).
(A4)
In other words, a FSWwill register if the sum of extra consumptive utility, obtained from the increased supply of sex acts
and the disappearance of expected legal penalty, is greater than the expected increased external and internal stigma. By
using the envelope theorem, one can show that VR is increasing in A and the slope is greater for V0 than V1, because the
marginal utility is greater and (negatively signed) probability of being known is no larger for the non-registered FSWs. So
the inequality (A4) is likely to hold for a small A (see Assumption 2.3′).
Assumption 2.3′. Equation 3 holds for a small enough A.
Given that external stigmadepends positively onhouseholdwealth, one can show that the decision to registerR switches
from 0 to 1 as A becomes smaller. That is, there exists A such that V1(A) > V0(A) for A ≤ A as shown in Figure 2.
In a related manner, we note that a FSW with a smaller A provides more sex acts hence finds more benefits in
registration. This is seen by deriving the following comparative statics result:
daR
dA = −
FA
Fa
= −u
′′ · (wR′aR + wR) − 𝛿R′ (aR)s′(A)
SOC .
The denominator is the second order condition (SOC) = u′′ · (wR′aR + wR)2 + u′ · (2wR′ + wR′′aR) − {𝛿R′′s + 𝜏′′(a) +
(1 − R)r′′(a)m} that holds strictly under the assumptions we have made (SOC = Fa < 0 ). Then, the above fraction has
a negative sign: The poorer the FSW is, the more sex acts she will perform and the more likely she will decide to get
registered.
We also note the effects of a penaltym. As it increases themarginal cost of supplying a, a largerm decreases the number
of sex acts a0 for the non-registered FSWs. In Figure 2, one can see the effects of the introduction of a penalty m on the
registration decision. More precisely, it shifts down the value function of non-registration, changing the intersection to
bm and thus the associated threshold asset to a larger level denoted as A(m) with A′(m) > 0, A(m) > A(0) form ∈ R++.
To sum up, a larger penalty induces FSWs with a larger A to register.
A.1.3 Health risk
We assume that a FSW is endowed with health capital, which gives the utility level of 0. For the number of sex acts
chosen, there is a probability 𝜋 that the FSWwill be infected with an STI. If infected, the health utility will be reduced by
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I, which is the cost of illness. For simplicity, we assume that a FSW first chooses a and finds out her infection status after
completing these sex acts. This ordering of events corresponds to the periodic timing of routine visits to the health center
after supplying sex acts for some time for the registered, while we asume the same order of events for the non-registered.
We assume that an STI is a curable disease as in syphilis or a treatable disease as in the case of HIV/AIDS. We therefore
let the health capital recover to the original level if treated.
The probability 𝜋 of being infected is a function of the number of sex acts, with the chance nondecreasing in a, 𝜋′(a) ⩾ 0.
All FSWs are assumed to face the same infection risk.14 On the other hand, with a periodical medical follow-up provided
to registered FSWs, STI symptoms are more likely to be noticed and treated by health providers. We therefore assume that
the probability of having an STI cured 𝛽R ∈ [0, 1] is greater for registered FSWs than for unregistered FSWs, 𝛽0 ⩽ 𝛽1. The
net effect of registering on health is unambiguously beneficial for any level of a: −𝜋(a)(1 − 𝛽0)I ⩽ −𝜋(a)(1 − 𝛽1)I.
The health inclusive utility is given as U = u − 𝛿s − 𝜏 − (1 − R)rm − 𝜋 · (1 − 𝛽R)I.
After introducing the health risk, we modify Assumptions 2.1′, 2.2′, and 2.3′ in the following way:
Assumption 2.1′. For all a ∈ R+:
w1′ (a)a + w1(a)
w0′ (a)a + w0(a)
⩾ 𝛼𝛿
1′ (a) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋′(a)(1 − 𝛽1)
𝛼𝛿0′ (a) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋′(a)(1 − 𝛽0)
, with 𝛼 = s(A)s(A) + I .
Assumption 2.2′. Internal stigma 𝜏 is an increasing, convex function of a, such that it dominates the decrease in
density 𝛿′′, r′(a), and 𝜋′(a) for any A,m, 𝛽R, I for a large a:
𝛿R
′′ (a)s(A) + 𝜏′′(a) + (1 − R)r′′(a)m + 𝜋′′(a)(1 − 𝛽R)I ⩾ 0.
For a small a under bell-shaped density for 𝛿′′ and r′, this is always satisfied.
Assumption 2.3′. Equation A8 holds for a small enough A.
Then we can derive the following:
Proposition 2.1′. There exists AI such that V1(A) ⩾ V0(A) for A ≤ AI: For a small enough level of wealth, a FSW
decides to register, and AI ⩾ A.
Proposition 2.2′. a1 ⩾ a0 holds under the health risks. This holds even under 𝛽0 = 𝛽1. aR is smaller than in the absence
of infection risk for R = {0, 1}.
Proposition 2.3′. The greater the probability 𝛽R of being cured, the greater the sex act supply aR. The access to quality
health services increases the number of sex acts.
Proposition 2.4′. The greater the damage I, the smaller the sex act supply aR. The severity of a disease reduces the number
of sex acts.
Remark 2.1′. If the relative risk of being infected for registered FSWs compared with non-registered FSWs is lower
(greater) than the relative probability of being treated, that is, 𝜋(a
1)
𝜋(a0) < (>)
(1−𝛽0)
(1−𝛽1) , registration ensures a lower (greater)
expected physical health damage.
Proposition 2.1′ shows that the threshold asset level of registration is larger than in the absence of infection risk due to
the relative curative effectiveness under registration. Proposition 2.2′ shows that registered FSWs still work more inten-
sively than unregistered FSWs even if this leads to greater infection risks. It shows that the prospect of health damage and
subsequent access to health services for registered FSWmake registrationmore attractive. It also shows that, even if there
is no difference in the probability of being treated, 𝛽0 = 𝛽1, it is possible for a FSW to register and supply larger a relative
to non-registered status. This can pose a challenge to public health because the non-health merits of registration induce
FSWs to register, under which they supply more a and get infected more frequently, and unless they have a superior cure
rate, it translates to higher STI incidence. Proposition 2.3′ reflects the moral hazard resulting from a higher probability 𝛽1
14One may argue that clients' riskiness differs between registered and non-registered FSWs. With a bigger market size for the registered, one may
conjecture that there will be riskier clients, whereas one can also argue that the non-registered will face the clients in the underground market, which
may be riskier. Given there is no evidence on client's self-selection process, we choose not to make a strong assumption on it.
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of being curedwhen clinics cannot observe risky acts. In fact, if the probability of being cured is 1, the supply of sex act will
no longer be affected by infection risk and the maximization problem (A5) is reduced to (A2). Proposition 2.4′ expresses
that there is a negative relationship between the severity of STIs that FSWs could contract and the number of sex acts they
supply. Finally, Proposition 2.2′ indicates 𝜋(a1) ⩾ 𝜋(a0)while we assume 1−𝛽0 ⩾ 1−𝛽1. Therefore, Remark 2.1′ indicates
that the expected health damage may or may not increase after registration 𝜋(a1)(1 − 𝛽1) ⋚ 𝜋(a0)(1 − 𝛽0). The effect of
registration on health outcomes is ambiguous and will depend on the extent of increase in infection risks 𝜋(a1) − 𝜋(a0).
A.1.4 Concavity of the maximization problem
SOC for the maximum under (p1) is given as below:
Fa = u′′ · (wR
′aR + wR)2 + u′ · (2wR′ + wR′′aR) − {𝛿R′′ (a)s(A) + 𝜏′′(a) + (1 − R)r′′(a)m} < 0.
The SOCholds ifmarginal income is nonincreasing (2wR′ +wR′′aR ⩽ 0, which holds for non-Giffen goods), and probability
𝛿R is convex at aR (𝛿R′′ (aR) ⩾ 0) and 𝜏′′(a0) is convex at a0, both of which hold for a smooth, bell-shaped density at
aR ⩽ 𝜇aR . For aR > 𝜇aR , it is possible that, given that 𝛿R(a), r(a) are already high enough, the marginal increase in these
probabilities can become smaller as one increases a, which is the case for bell-shaped density functions with an infinite
support. However, this induces the FSWs to supply asmuch sex acts as possible, which is clearly unrealistic. So we assume
the following for SOC to hold:
Assumption 2.2:
𝛿R
′′ (a)s(A) + 𝜏′′(a) + (1 − R)r′′(a)m ⩾ 0.
Assumption 2.2 is a sufficient condition for the SOC for themaximum to hold at a large a. For aR > 𝜇aR , we have decreasing
marginal density, and it is necessary to assume that the marginal increase of internal stigma is large enough to ensure the
SOC to hold. The convexity assumption of internal stigma is consistent with our data in which more active FSWs report
more psychological problems.
A.1.5 Comparative statics with health
A FSW under registration status R now solves the following maximization program:
max
{aR}
u(cR) − 𝛿R(aR)s(A) − 𝜏(aR) − (1 − R)r(aR)m − 𝜋(aR)(1 − 𝛽R)I
s.t. wR(aR)aR + A = cR.
(A5)
The FOC for (A5) is
F2 ≡ u′ · (wR
′aR + wR) − 𝛿′′(aR)s(A) − 𝜏′(aR) − (1 − R)r′(aR)m − 𝜋′(aR)(1 − 𝛽R)I = 0. (A6)
Compared with the FOC (2) in the absence of infection risks, there is an extra negative term −𝜋′(aR)(1 − 𝛽R)I, which
makes aR to be smaller.
Again, to ensure that the solution is the maximum, we modify Assumption 2.2 as Assumption 2.2′. Assumption 2.3′
holds for a larger A than in Equation 3, so we can find AI in an analogous way as in Proposition 2.1, only that AI ⩾ A
because the expected infection damage is larger for the non-registered FSWs.
We can derive how the number of acts aR varies with wealth A, with the probability of being cured 𝛽R and with the size
of STI damage when left untreated I with SOC denoted as F2awhich holds under Assumption 2.2′.
daR
dA = −
u′′ · (wR′aR + wR) − 𝛿R′ (aR)s′(A)
F2a
⩽ 0,
daR
d𝛽R
= −𝜋
R′ (aR)I
F2a
⩾ 0,
daR
dI =
𝜋R
′ (aR)(1 − 𝛽R)
F2a
⩽ 0.
(A7)
Again, a FSW decides to register if her maximized utility under registration V1 is greater than under illegality V0:
V0 = u(c0) − 𝛿0(a0)s(A) − 𝜏(a0) − r(a0)m − 𝜋(a0)(1 − 𝛽0)I
< u(c1) − 𝛿1(a1)s(A) − 𝜏(a1) − 𝜋(a1)(1 − 𝛽1)I = V1.
(A8)
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TABLE A1 Balancing of covariates
Means Variances Skewness
Controls Controls Controls
Covariates Pre Post Treated Pre Post Treated Pre Post Treated
Age 36.06 36.81 36.81 82.49 75.01 75.01 0.301 0.284 0.284
Divorced 0.670 0.745 0.745 0.222 0.191 0.190 −0.723 −1.126 −1.126
No education 0.227 0.330 0.330 0.176 0.222 0.222 1.307 0.722 0.722
Has at least one child 0.896 0.881 0.881 0.093 0.106 0.106 −2.602 −2.346 −2.346
Father/mother live in Dakar 0.625 0.472 0.472 0.235 0.250 0.250 −0.515 0.113 0.113
Preference towards the future 0.178 0.233 0.233 0.147 0.179 0.179 1.684 1.265 1.265
Altruism (more than 400 FCFA) 0.197 0.387 0.387 0.159 0.238 0.238 1.520 0.465 0.465
Risk aversion 0.725 0.709 0.709 0.571 0.587 0.587 0.755 0.775 0.775
Beauty 0.799 0.745 0.745 0.161 0.190 0.190 −1.495 −1.126 −1.126
Entered the sex business alone 0.576 0.487 0.487 0.245 0.251 0.251 −0.308 0.050 0.050
Fatality 0.702 0.572 0.572 0.210 0.246 0.246 −0.885 −0.293 −0.292
Own house 0.269 0.135 0.135 0.197 0.117 0.117 1.044 2.132 2.133
TABLE A2 Composition of the super learner
Models Risk Coefficient
Stepwise regression with interactions 0.2425 0.2248
Logistic regression 0.2340 0.0000
Generalized additive model 0.2343 0.0000
Random forest 0.2375 0.0482
Polynomial spline regression 0.2425 0.0000
Neural network 0.2537 0.0360
Stepwise regression 0.2393 0.0000
Bayesian generalized linear model 0.2338 0.2786
Classification and regression routines 0.2371 0.0116
Classification and regression trees (CART): Recursive partitioning 0.2512 0.0000
Bootstrapped aggregated CART 0.2346 0.0000
Gradient boosting 0.2315 0.1508
Support vector machine 0.2381 0.2500
Generalized linear model with penalized maximum likelihood 0.2334 0.0000
Multivariate adaptive regression splines 0.2406 0.0000
Note. A low risk indicates a greater performance of the model. The coefficients indicate how much weight the
super learner puts on each model in the weighted-average.
TABLE A3 Robustness checks—Final outcomes
Entropy Super
PSM balancing learner
Outcomes ATT Sign. Coeff. Sign. ATT Sign.
Observations T = 318 C = 308 T = 280 C = 283
Physical health
Has been sick or injured in the past 4 weeks −0.109 ∗∗ −0.120 ∗∗∗ −0.133 ∗∗
Had lower abdominal pain in the past month −0.055 ∗ −0.060 ∗ −0.047 NS
Well-being
Is not happy 0.077 ∗ 0.086 ∗∗ 0.074 NS
Is not satisfied at all in general 0.074 ∗∗ 0.074 ∗ 0.022 NS
Strongly disagree with
“Overall I am satisfied with myself” 0.090 ∗∗∗ 0.093 ∗∗∗ 0.087 ∗∗∗
Note. NS stands for “not significant.” Results in italic come from Table 3. ATT stands for average treatment effect on the treated. Results of the Gaussian Kernel
matching on the common support with replacement and 1,000 replications are presented for super learner. T and C indicate the number of treated and control
observations, respectively. Super learner propensity score is a weighted linear combination of candidates presented in Table A2. p< 0.1 p< 0.05 p< 0.01.
1650 ITO ET AL.
TABLE A4 Robustness checks—Intermediate outcomes
Entropy Super
PSM balancing learner
Outcomes ATT Sign. Coeff. Sign. ATT Sign.
Observations T = 318 C = 308 T = 280 C = 283
Prevention
Received free condoms 0.369 ∗∗∗ 0.373 ∗∗∗ 0.324 ∗∗∗
Is affiliated to a STD center 0.364 ∗∗∗ 0.358 ∗∗∗ 0.347 ∗∗∗
Went to a health center in the last month 0.560 ∗∗∗ 0.554 ∗∗∗ 0.543 ∗∗∗
Had a HIV screening in the past year 0.237 ∗∗∗ 0.221 ∗∗∗ 0.240 ∗∗∗
Sought care last STI 0.025 NS −0.041 NS −0.045 NS
Sought care last illness 0.055 NS 0.065 NS 0.058 NS
Unhealthy behaviors
Cigarette expenses in the last 7 days 560 ∗ 483 NS 704 ∗∗
Alcohol expenses in the last 7 days 1300 ∗∗∗ 1335 ∗∗∗ 1498 ∗∗∗
Sex work environment
Number of clients per week 2.665 ∗∗∗ 2.617 ∗∗∗ 2.408 ∗∗∗
Attracts usually clients in bars or nightclubs 0.338 ∗∗∗ 0.320 ∗∗∗ 0.362 ∗∗∗
Last client was an occasional client 0.153 ∗∗∗ 0.151 ∗∗∗ 0.179 ∗∗∗
Had alcohol before last sex act 0.062 ∗∗ 0.064 ∗∗∗ 0.061 ∗
Last client consumed alcohol 0.125 ∗∗∗ 0.118 ∗∗∗ 0.135 ∗∗∗
Multiple clients relationship during last sex act 0.051 ∗∗ 0.050 ∗∗ 0.052 ∗
Used a condom during last sex act 0.016 NS 0.019 NS 0.003 NS
Anal intercourse during last sex act 0.019 NS 0.023 ∗∗ 0.025 ∗∗
Fellatio during last sex act 0.015 NS 0.019 NS 0.024 NS
Is not satisfied at all with sex work 0.102 ∗∗ 0.087 ∗ 0.035 NS
In the past year:
Suffered from violence of an occasional client 0.101 ∗ 0.063 NS 0.115 ∗
Suffered from police violence 0.047 ∗ 0.068 ∗∗∗ 0.032 NS
Fear police
In the past year:
If suffered from client violence
went to report it to the police 0.192 ∗∗ 0.103 NS 0.055 NS
Earnings and savings
Monthly earnings from sex work (FCFA) 62793 ∗∗∗ 56792 ∗∗∗ 61930 ∗∗∗
Savings in the past month (FCFA) 24332 ∗∗∗ 25232 ∗∗∗ 27559 ∗∗∗
Leaving sex work
Is sure that she will no longer
be a FSW in 3 years −0.066 NS −0.082 ∗ −0.065 NS
Social network
Rivalry 54 ∗∗ 46 NS −3 NS
Altruism towards other sexworker 2 NS −1 NS −1 NS
Life satisfaction with friends −0.255 ∗∗∗ −0.262 ∗∗∗ −0.224 ∗∗∗
Has at least one FSW to go to be reassured −0.146 ∗∗∗ −0.144 ∗∗∗ −0.145 ∗
Has at least one FSW to borrow money to −0.122 ∗∗∗ −0.124 ∗∗∗ −0.135 ∗∗
Stigma
Family knows about her sex work activity 0.080 ∗∗ 0.069 NS 0.080 NS
Life satisfaction with family −0.219 ∗∗∗ −0.225 ∗∗∗ −0.178 ∗∗
Note. NS stands for “not significant.” Results in italic come from Table 4. ATT stands for average treatment effect on the treated.
Results of the Gaussian Kernel matching on the common support with replacement and 1,000 replications are presented for
super learner. T and C indicate the number of treated and control observations, respectively. Super learner propensity score is a
weighted linear combination of candidates presented in Table A2. FSW: female sex worker; STI: sexually transmitted infection.
p< 0.1. p< 0.05. p< 0.01.
In other words, a FSW would register if the increase in consumptive utility, decrease in health risks, and averted
expected penalty amount is greater than the increased external and internal stigma costs. This holds for a larger A than
in Equation 3, so we can find A in an analogous way as in Proposition 2.1.
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A.2 Simulations for the sensitivity analysis
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
FIGURE A1 Simulations [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
A.3 Robustness check: Improving covariates balance using entropy balancing
Hainmueller (2012) introduced entropy balancing, a data preprocessing procedure that directly focuses on covariate bal-
ancing and is able to ensure balancing not only on the first moment of the distribution but also on any specified moment.
One can then force the distribution of all covariates considered to look very similar in the treatment and in the reweighted
control groups, thereby simulating a randomized experiment. We implement entropy balancing so that the three first
moments of the distribution of each covariate used to estimate the propensity score are identical for registered and
non-registered FSWs. Table A1 shows the differences between the two groups before and after implementing the entropy
balancing procedure. Weights generated by this procedure are then used to estimate the causal effect of registration on
the outcomes of interest, which lead to similar results as the ones obtained with propensity score matching (see Tables A3
and A4).
A.4 Robustness check: Improving specification of the propensity score using a super
learner
Although it is common practice to use logistic regression to estimate propensity score, there is evidence that propensity
score model misspecification can lead to biases in treatment estimation (Drake, 1993). Machine learning methods can
be used for propensity score estimation in order to choose the optimal regression algorithm among a set of candidates
(Pirracchio, Petersen, & van der Laan, 2014). We implement the method proposed by van der Laan, Polley, and Hubbard
(2007) so that a weighted linear combination of the candidate learners associated with a high performance is used as
a super learner estimator. To achieve this, we include 15 different models in the super learner library (see Table A2).
Table A2 displays the composition of the super learner estimator. Figure A2 shows the common support based on the
super learner propensity score estimation. We can note that the overlap is reduced compared with before (see Figure 4)
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FIGURE A2 Common support based on super learner weights. FSW: female sex worker [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
but that the distributions in the treatment and control groups are more asymmetric. Despite having a lower number of
units on support (563 vs. 626), ATTs based on the scores estimated with a super learner remain of comparable magnitude
(see Tables A3 and A4) than the ones obtained using a logistic regression.
